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1 Introduction
The global financial crisis has led to a renewed debate about both the nature and
eﬀectiveness of financial regulation, and the extent to which central banks should con-
sider more explicitly financial stability objectives in the conduct of monetary policy.
A key issue in this context has been the design of macroprudential instruments that
help to mitigate the procyclicality of the financial system, that is, credit booms and
busts that exacerbate the inherent cyclicality of lending–and consequently distort in-
vestment decisions, either by fueling excessive growth in credit or restricting access to
bank finance.1
Among these countercyclical instruments, capital buﬀers have attracted the most
interest in policy circles and academic research. Under the Basel III regime for in-
stance, central banks can now impose a countercyclical capital buﬀer ranging from 0 to
2.5 percent of risk-weighted assets; the buﬀer itself is related to excess growth in credit
to the private sector, viewed as a good indicator of systemic risk (see Basel Committee
on Banking Supervision (2011)).2 In academic research, a number of recent contribu-
tions have studied the performance of countercyclical capital rules in New Keynesian
dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models; these contributions include
Suh (2011), Agénor et al. (2013), and Angelini et al. (2014).
There has been also much discussion about the use of loan loss provisions as a
countercyclical regulatory rule. In general, loan loss provisions can be classified into two
main categories: a) specific provisions, which depend on expected losses on loans which
have been identified as impaired or nonperforming, that is, if they have not been repaid
a certain number of days (usually 90 days) past the due date; and b) general provisions,
which depend on expected losses on loans which are not necessarily impaired but are
likely to be in the future.3 In the United Kingdom for instance, general provisions are
subjective but banks should take into account past experience and current economic
1See Athanasoglou et al. (2014) for an overview of the literature on the causes and consequences
of procyclicality in banking.
2See Drehmann et al. (2010), Repullo and Saurina (2011), and Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision (2012) for a more detailed discussion.
3Perez et al. (2008) note that general provisions usually rise during an economic upturn, as banks
give out more loans and the demand for credit is high during this period. During a downturn, loans
to riskier companies would incur larger loan losses as risks materialize, and therefore higher specific
loan-loss provisions follow.
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conditions. Specific provisions are governed by International Accounting Standards
(IAS) 39, which require domestic banks to adopt an incurred loss method of loan loss
provisioning: this implies that provisions are set only once a loss has incurred. As
a result, general provisions often represent only a small fraction of total provisions.
More importantly, some observers have argued that IAS 39 accounting guidelines have
been a predominant source of procyclicality in lending standards, because loan loss
provisions tend to be essentially ex post.4 Indeed, with the incurred loss approach, the
recognition of loan losses is delayed until borrowers actually default. Moreover, there
are often restrictions on the tax deductibility of provisioning expenses, which tend
to aﬀect the cyclicality of bank profits, market valuations, and their funding costs.
The result is that it can be diﬃcult for a bank to increase provisions in an economic
boom–even if it correctly judges that the future ability of its borrowers to repay has
deteriorated. A possible consequence is that banks may reduce lending in recessions,
thereby magnifying the impact of negative shocks (Beatty and Liao (2011), and Balla
et al. (2012)).
This raises therefore the broader question of redesigning accounting principles (that
is, switching from an incurred loss approach to an expected loss approach) to improve
banking sector stability and mitigate procyclicality as well as systemic risk. Indeed,
the Basel Committee continues to work with the International Accounting Standards
Board (IASB) on the expected loss approach to loan loss provisioning. The view is
that if dynamic provisions can take into account more credit information and anticipate
and quantify better the expected losses associated with a loan portfolio, they would
provide additional buﬀers and better incentives to mitigate procyclicality. This is
the fundamental idea of dynamic provisioning rules, which have been used for some
time in Spain.5 The Spanish system requires higher provisions when credit grows
more than the historical average, thus linking provisioning to the credit and business
cycle. This both discourages (although does not eliminate) excessive lending in booms
and strengthens the banks for bad times. Studies that have attempted to evaluate
4In the United States, under the guidelines of the Generally Accepted Accounting Standards
(GAAP), loan loss provisions should be established at a level that is adequate (but not excessive)
to cover expected losses related to identified impaired loans and probable credit losses which have
been incurred as of the balance sheet date. Thus, they are also essentially ex post in nature.
5The introduction of countercyclical provisions in Spain was facilitated by the fact that the design
of accounting rules falls under the authority of the Central Bank of Spain.
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the performance of Spain’s dynamic loan provisioning system include Saurina (2009),
Caprio (2010), and Jiménez et al. (2012), and Fernández de Lis and Garcia-Herrero
(2013); all concluded that although the provisioning scheme allowed banks to enter the
downswing associated with the global financial crisis in more robust shape than they
would have been otherwise, it is less clear that it had any material eﬀect on the credit
cycle or that it helped in any significant way to contain Spain’s real estate bubble
over the previous decade. Put diﬀerently, even though these systems may succeed in
making banks more resilient–by increasing their capacity to absorb expected losses,
in contrast to capital requirements–they appear to have limited eﬀectiveness when it
comes to restraining credit growth.6
This paper contributes to the debate on the performance of loan loss provisioning
systems by embedding specific and dynamic provisioning rules in a New Keynesian
DSGE model with monopoly banking and financial frictions.7 Somewhat surprisingly,
there have been so far few attempts in the academic literature to address this issue.
One of the few analytical contributions in this area is Bouvatier and Lepetit (2012),
but their framework is not a full general equilibrium analysis. The model that we
develop integrates elements of the DSGE framework developed in Agénor et al. (2013)
with Bouvatier and Lepetit (2012) to study the interaction between bank provisioning
rules, credit market imperfections, and business cycles in response to financial shocks.
Our analysis considers the extent to which these interactions aﬀect the procyclicality
of the financial system as well as real and financial volatility.
More specifically, the commercial bank’s loan pricing in the model is directly linked
to loan loss provisions through two main transmission channels: the risk premium
channel and the provisioning cost channel. The first channel is related to the fact that
loan-loss provisions can either increase or lower the fraction of nonperforming loans,
which in turn impacts the risk premium over the cost of borrowing from the central bank
(the refinance rate). The provisioning cost channel is linked to the characteristics of
loan-loss provisions reserves being invested in a safe asset (therefore entering positively
the bank’s profit function), and the direct cost of holding provisions which reduce
6See Wezel et al. (2012) for a further discussion. As noted in Wezel (2010), several countries in
Latin America have introduced dynamic loan provisioning systems in recent years, but their experience
is too recent to provide robust conclusions.
7Dynamic loan loss provisions are also referred to as “forward-looking” or “statistical” provisions.
Because these terms can be confusing to some, we have chosen not to use them in this paper.
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bank profits and result in a higher loan rate. Our numerical experiments, based on
a parameterized version of the model show that a dynamic provisioning regime can
be highly eﬀective in mitigating procyclicality of the financial system–regardless of
the presence, or direction, of the risk premium channel. The results also indicate that
the combination of a credit gap-augmented Taylor rule and a dynamic provisioning
system with full smoothing may be a more eﬀective way–in terms of minimizing a
central bank policy loss function–to mitigate real and financial volatility, compared to
a specific provisioning regime, coupled or not with an augmented Taylor rule. Moreover,
the combination of a standard Taylor rule and a dynamic provisioning regime with
full smoothing performs better than a credit-augmented rule combined with specific
provisions.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the model.
We keep the presentation relatively brief, given that several of its ingredients are de-
scribed at length in Agénor and Alper (2012) and Agénor et al. (2013); instead, we
focus on how the model presented here departs from those papers, especially with re-
spect to bank balance sheets and provisioning rules.8 Key features of the steady-state
equilibrium and the log-linearized model are characterized in Section 3. Parameteri-
zation is discussed in Section 4. The impulse response functions associated with our
core experiment, a positive shock to nonperforming loans, are presented in Section
5. Sensitivity analysis is reported in Section 6. In Section 7, we consider a diﬀerent
but related experiment–whether it is optimal to combine a specific or dynamic provi-
sioning system with a credit gap-augmented Taylor rule to mitigate real and financial
volatility. The last section oﬀers some concluding remarks and discusses some possible
extensions of the analysis.
2 The Model
Consider an economy consisting of seven types of agents: forward-looking optimizing
households, a final good (FG) firm, a continuum of intermediate good (IG) firms, a
capital good (CG) producer, a single commercial bank, a government, and a central
bank, which also acts as the bank regulator. The IG firms rent capital from the CG
8The present model diﬀers from these previous contributions also to the extent that Calvo contracts
are used for price setters. However, this diﬀerence plays no substantive role in the results.
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producer and employ labor to produce a unique good. These intermediate goods are
then all combined by the FG firm, who produces a homogeneous final good, which, in
turn, can be used for either consumption, investment or government spending.
The commercial bank receives deposits from households, supplies credit to the CG
producer for investment financing, decides on the deposit rate and lending rate, and
borrows from the central bank to cover any shortfall in funding. The supply of loans
is perfectly elastic at the prevailing lending rate. The bank receives gross interest
payments on investment loans and pays back principal plus interest on households’
deposits and loans from the central bank. In addition, the bank holds loan-loss re-
serves. Provisioning rules are set by the central bank, and can be either (following
common terminology in banking) specific or dynamic. In the former case, provisions
are triggered by past due payments (or the fraction of nonperforming loans), which, in
turn, depend on current economic conditions and the loan-loss provisions-loan ratio.
Dynamic provisioning, by contrast, take into account both past due payments, as be-
fore, and expected losses over the whole business cycle; thus, provisions are smoothed
over the cycle and are less aﬀected by the current state of the economy and past due
payments. We now turn to a more detailed description of the behavior of each agent
in this economy.
2.1 Households
There is a continuum of households of measure 1, who consume, hold deposits and
cash, invest in government bonds, and supply labor to IG firms.
The objective of the representative household is to maximize the utility function







1 +  +  ln
£¡ ¢1− ¤¾  (1)
where E is the expectations operator conditional on the information available in period
, and  ∈ (0 1) denotes the discount factor. The term  denotes consumption of
the final good at time  while  represents the time- hours devoted to labor by
the household. Parameter  stands for the inverse of intertemporal the elasticity of
substitution in consumption, whereas  denotes the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of
labor supply.
Households hold real cash balances  , which yield no return, and real bank
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deposits, , which bear a net interest rate of  . Real cash balances combined with
real bank deposits generate a composite monetary asset, given by a Cobb-Douglas
form,
¡ ¢ ()1−, where  ∈ (0 1). In addition, households invest in one-period
government bonds,  , which yield a net interest of  . Hence, total gross repayments
from holding deposits and government bonds in period  − 1 (adjusted to real terms
in period ) are respectively given by (1+ −1)−1−1 and (1+ −1)−1−1,
with  denoting the price of the final good.9
At the start of period , each household chooses the level of deposits, cash and
government bonds, labor supply, for which it earns a factor payment of −1 ,
where  is the nominal wage. At the end of period , households receive all profits
from IG firms,  =
R 1
0
 , and the CG producer,  , in the form of lump-sum
transfers. They also receive all profits from the commercial bank,  , and pay a
lump-sum tax given by  in real terms.10
The representative households budget constraint is thus given by







  +  +  − 
Maximizing (1) subject to (2) with respect to , ,  ,  , and , and taking
interest rates and prices as given, yields
− = E[−+1(1 +  ) +1 ] (3)
 = (1− )
 (1 +  )
 −   (4)
 = 
 (1 +  )
  (5)
 = ( − )1 (6)
9The menu of financial assets considered here (cash, deposits, and bonds) is quite rich at the
outset because, as is made clear later, it matters for the monetary transmission mechanism. Agénor
and Alper (2012) provide a more detailed discussion of the importance of accounting for the money
market in the determination of the bond rate and in understanding linkages between the real and
financial sides.
10The final good firm earns zero profits in equilibrium, as noted below.
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where  =  is the real wage. Equation (3) is the standard Euler equation.
Equation (4) relates deposits positively to consumption and the deposit rate, and
negatively to the rate of return on government bonds, whereas equation (5) relates the
demand for cash positively to consumption and negatively with its opportunity cost,
measured by the rate of return on bonds. Equation (6) defines labor supply.
2.2 Final Good Firm
A perfectly competitive representative FG firm assembles a continuum of intermediate











where   1 denotes the constant elasticity of substitution between the diﬀerentiated
intermediate goods. The FG firm chooses the optimal quantities of intermediate goods,
, that maximize its profits, taking as given both the prices of the intermediate goods,
, and the final good price, . This optimization problem yields the demand function
for each intermediate good,
 = ( )
−  (8)







2.3 Intermediate Good Firms
A continuum of IG producers, indexed by  ∈ (0 1), operate in a monopolistic environ-
ment and use capital and labor to produce a unique good. The IG firm rents capital
from the CG producer at the rate  , and employs labor, for which it pays a real wage
of  . Each IG firm  faces the Cobb-Douglas production function
 = 1−  (10)
where  denotes the amount of capital,  labor supplied by the representative
household to firm , and  ∈ (0 1). The term  represents a common economy wide
technology shock which follows the (1) process, ˜ = (−1˜) exp( ), where
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 is the autoregressive coeﬃcient,  a normally distributed random shock with zero
mean and a constant variance, and a ‘~’ is used to denote a steady-state value.11
The IG firm solves a two stage pricing decision problem during period . In the
first stage, each IG producer minimizes the cost of renting capital and employing labor,
taking wages and the rental price of capital as given. Specifically, the IG firm solves
min  +  , subject to (10). The optimal capital-labor ratio takes the
familiar form  = (1− )−1 ¡  ¢, with the unit real marginal cost equal
to
 =
¡ ¢1− ¡ ¢
 (1− )1−  (11)
In the second stage, each IG producer chooses the optimal price for its good. Here
we assume familiar Calvo contracts, where a portion  ∈ (0 1) firms keep their prices
fixed while a portion of 1−  firms adjust prices optimally given the going marginal














where  ∗ is the optimal price chosen by firms adjusting their prices at period  and
( − 1) represents the price mark-up.
2.4 Capital Good Producer
The CG producer owns all physical capital in the economy and uses a linear production
function to produce capital goods. In order to produce these goods, the CG producer
spends  on the final good. For this purpose, it must pay for these goods in advance
and borrows from the commercial bank at the beginning of the period. Thus, the real
amount borrowed from the commercial bank,  , is13
 =  (13)
11Results of supply shocks did not show significant diﬀerences across provisioning regimes and are
not reported here to save space.
12We drop the subscript  because all re-optimizing firms choose the same price so everything
becomes time dependent.
13The assumption that all investment is financed through bank loans is consistent with the assump-
tions that all profits are distributed at the end of each period (which implies that retained earnings
from any period cannot be used in the next period to fund capital accumulation) and that there are
no alternatives to bank credit in the economy.
9
The net interest rate charged by the bank for funding these investments is denoted
by  . However, repayment is uncertain. If there is default, which occurs with prob-
ability  ∈ (0 1), the CG producer loses the collateral that it pledges to secure the
loan; collateral is given by , where  ∈ (0 1) is the fraction of the capital stock
that can be eﬀectively pledged as collateral. If loans are repaid in full, an event that
occurs with probability 1− , the total cost faced by the CG producer at the end of
period  is (1 +  ) . Thus, expected repayment is  + (1− )(1 +  ) .
To produce new capital, +1, the CG producer uses the investment good together
with the existing stock of capital from the previous period (net of depreciation). In
addition, the CG producer incurs adjustment costs in producing new capital. Hence,
capital evolves according to






where  ∈ (0 1) denotes the constant rate of depreciation, andΘ  0 the adjustment
cost parameter. The new capital stock is then rented to the IG firms at the rate  .
The CG producer chooses the level of capital stock so as to maximize the value
of discounted stream of dividend payments to households subject to equation (14).
Specifically, defining E+1 =  −− (1−)(1+  ) as the CG producer’s








−(1− +)(1 + +)
∙








The first-order condition yields the arbitrage condition (see Appendix A):
E+1 = (1− )(1 +  )E
½∙
1 +Θ(+1 − 1)
¸





+1 − (1− +1)(1 + +1)
∙









which shows that the fraction of nonperforming loans aﬀects the expected rate of return
to capital (and thus the amount of capital produced), through its eﬀect on expected
repayment in both period  and period + 1.
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2.5 Commercial Bank
2.5.1 Balance Sheet and Loan-Loss Reserves
At the start of period  the commercial bank collects deposits from households in order
to supply credit to the CG producer. The supply of credit is perfectly elastic at the
prevailing loan rate and therefore the total amount of lending provided by the bank
is given by equation (13). To fund any shortfall in funding, the commercial bank
borrows an amount of  from the central bank, for which it pays an interest rate
of  . Moreover, the bank holds government bonds  (a safe asset) which yields an
interest of  14 As the loan portfolio takes into account expected loan losses, loan-loan
reserves,  , are subtracted from total loans, consistent with standard practice (see
Walter (1991) and Bouvatier and Lepetit (2012)).15 The bank’s balance sheet in real
terms is thus
 −  + =  +   (16)
The bank must also satisfy regulation in the form of setting loan-loss provisions (a
flow), which are deducted from current earnings. As noted earlier, these provisions,
which are defined in detail in the next section, can be based on either a specific or dy-
namic system. Loan-loss reserves (a stock) are accumulated partly by current loan-loss
provisions and partly through past reserves through a geometric average specification.
Specifically, to relate loan-loss provisions, , and loan-loss reserves we assume that
although accounting rules require provisioning requirements to be satisfied at the end
of each period, the bank builds provisions up gradually during the period. This leads
to a partial adjustment formulation, which takes the form
 = (−1)(  )1−  (17)
where  =  denotes specific and dynamic, respectively, and  ∈ (0 1) is a
persistence parameter. The key advantage of this specification is that in the steady
state, the parameter  plays no role; the stock of reserves is equal to the flow of
provisions, regardless of the provisioning regime in place.
14We abstract from required reserves, given the purpose of this paper.
15In standard accounting, loan-loss provisions are defined as an estimation of probable loan losses
for a current year and are charged as an expense, deducted from current profits (although, as noted
earlier, these deductions are subject to restrictions in practice). Loan-loss reserves, by contrast, are
a balance sheet item that depend on loan-loss provisions, accumulated charged oﬀ loans, and loan
recoveries. The latter two components are ignored here for simplicity.
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In each period the bank invests its loan-loss reserves in the safe asset ( =  )
and earns a return of  on them. Given this assumption, the balance sheet constraint
(16) can be used to determine residually the level of borrowing from (or deposits at)
the central bank:
 =  − (18)
2.5.2 Alternative Provisioning Rules
Provisioning rules are set by the central bank. We consider two specifications of loan-
loss provisions, which depend directly on the fraction of problem loans. First, a specific
provisioning system, where loan-loss provisions are triggered by past due payments.
Second, a dynamic provisioning system, where the bank makes provisions based on
past due payments as well as expected losses over the whole business cycle.
To relate loan-loss provisions to the fraction of nonperforming loans (which in the
present setting corresponds also to the default probability), we adopt a quasi-reduced
form that emphasizes two sets of factors. First, we impose a negative correlation
between provisions and cyclical output, which is the main stylized fact in the deter-
mination of specific provisions; see for instance Cavallo and Majnoni (2002), Laeven
and Majnoni (2003), Bikker and Metzemakers (2005), and Nkusu (2011).16 This rela-
tionship is consistent with the idea that during economic booms, for instance, profits
and cash flows tend to improve, implying that the fraction of nonperforming loans, and
thus provisions, decrease.
Second, the fraction of problem loans (and thus loan-loss provisions) is related to
the loan-loss reserves-lending ratio. On the one hand, this relationship can be negative,
which is consistent with the idea that banks have a greater incentive to monitor their
borrowers when they hold large loan-loss reserves (add-backs to regulatory bank capital,
for instance). A greater degree of monitoring improves the ability of the bank to collect
the full return on investment loans, thereby reducing the fraction of problem debt and
the amount of required loan-loss provisions. If indeed loan-loss reserves can be treated
as add-backs to bank capital (as outlined in the Basel Accords), holding more loan-
16Cavallo and Majnoni (2002) for instance examine empirically the policies of large commercial
banks in various countries with regards to their provisions and income smoothing. These authors
find that bankers on average smooth their income but do not create enough provisions during good
times, implying that banks build provisions during recessions and not before. Therefore, the negative
relationship between business cycles and loan-loss provisions amplify the eﬀects of a recession.
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loss reserves relative to total loans allows banks to charge a lower spread on loans,
where the spread depends positively on the fraction of nonperforming loans.17 This
result is supported by the studies of Barth et al. (2004) and Coleman et al. (2006),
among others. Furthermore, in the context of the recent financial crisis, Cole and
White (2012) found evidence of a negative correlation between loan-loss reserves in
2007 and the probability of bank failure in 2009. Intuitively, loan-loss reserves may
represent a source of strength against future losses, which can reduce the probability of
a banking crisis associated with a higher fraction of nonperforming loans (see Cashin
and Duttagupta (2008)).
On the other hand, the relationship between the fraction of problem loans and loan-
loss reserves may also be positive, as documented for instance in Ng and Roychowdhury
(2011). They found that during the financial crisis of 2008-09, an increase in loan-loss
reserves translated into a higher risk of bank default and a rise in nonperforming
loans.18 Intuitively, holding more loan-loss reserves in the form of bank capital can
lead bankers to extend more loans, even during a crisis period, thereby increasing the
likelihood of moral hazard behavior and raising the possibility of default. Shrieves and
Dahl (1992) also show a positive relationship between higher capital and investments
in risky assets. Finally, Jin et al. (2011) also document a strong positive association
between loan-loss provisions and the probability of bank failure for financially weak
banks between 2007 and 2010. Bank failures, in turn, are often positively related with
nonperforming loans (see Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (2005)), which implies that
higher loan-loss reserves may indeed increase moral hazard behavior and induce a rise
in nonperforming loans.
Given this description, the fraction of nonperforming loans, , which is also the
17This monitoring incentive eﬀect (which was discussed in the context of bank capital by Agénor
et al. (2012)) is consistent with the fact that general provisions are recognized, up to a limit, as Tier
2 capital under Basel I and the standardised approach to Basel II. Under the Internal Rating Based
(IRB) approach, all provisions attributable to IRB-rated exposures (including specific provisions)
may be used to oﬀset expected losses. Surplus provisions (those in excess of expected losses) may be
counted as Tier 2 capital up to a limit of 0.6 percent of credit risk-weighted assets.
18However, Ng and Roychowdhury (2011) do not include bank characteristics prior to 2007, which
could also explain bank failures in the subsequent years if banks had been financially weak for example.
Cole and White (2012) do address these issues, thus making a comparison between these studies
diﬃcult.
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default probability if default is random, is therefore defined as





where   0,  ≷ 0. The term 0  0 represents the steady-state fraction of non-
performing loans, whereas the term ˜ (where ˜ is the steady-state value of output)
denotes the cyclical component of output. We also relate the fraction of nonperforming
loans to deviations in the loan-loss reserves-loan ratio. As explained earlier, the elastic-
ity  can be either negative or positive, depending on whether loan-loss reserves lead
to increased bank monitoring or induce moral hazard behavior. Because of this ambi-
guity, in the simulations reported later we will use  = 0 as the benchmark case and
will consider positive and negative values of  for sensitivity analysis. The random
variable  captures nonsystematic shocks to nonperforming loans, that is, shocks that
are not directly associated with movements in the output gap, collateral, and loan-loss
reserves. It follows an (1) process,  = (−1) exp( ), where  ∈ (0 1) and 
a normally distributed shock with zero mean and a constant variance.
Turning now to the diﬀerent types of provisioning rules, we first model the specific
provisioning system (denoted by superscript ), where the bank evaluates its credit
risk exposure on current nonperforming loans. Therefore, and similar to Bouvatier and
Lepetit (2012), we define loan-loss provisions in a specific system as
  = 0  (20)
where 0 is the steady-state fraction (or average fraction over a whole business cycle)
of nonperforming loans ( ), which are covered by loan-loss provisions in period .
Put diﬀerently, 0 is the coverage ratio, measured as loan-loss provisions divided by the
fraction of nonperforming loans.
The alternative specification for loan-loss provisions is the dynamic provisioning
system (denoted by superscript ), in which the bank makes provisions related to the
current percentage of nonperforming loans (as before) and the evaluation of the latent
risk over the whole business cycle. Specifically, following again Bouvatier and Lepetit
(2012), statistical loan-loss provisions can be written as






where  ∈ (0 1) denotes the degree of loan-loss provisions smoothing under the dynamic
system, and ˜ the steady-state value of the fraction of nonperforming loans (or the long-
run evaluation of latent risk by the commercial bank). Thus, the diﬀerence between
the two formulations relates to whether  = 0 or 0   ≤ 1. During an economic
expansion, where the short-run value of current nonperforming loans, , is lower than
the estimation of the latent risk over the whole cycle, ˜ , the commercial bank can build
up provisions, above and beyond specific provisions. Therefore, taking into account
expected losses over the business cycle oﬀsets the short-run impact of problem loans
on current provisions. In what follows we will refer to the case where  = 1 as full
smoothing, in the sense that any deviation in the fraction of nonperforming loans from
its steady-state value is completely reflected in the calculation of total provisions.
2.5.3 The Bank’s Optimization Problem
Given the structure of deposit and loan contracts, the bank’s decision problem can be
solved period by period. Specifically, in each period the bank sets ex ante the (gross)
deposit and lending rates in order to maximize the expected value of end-of-period real
profits, defined as19
E+1 = (1− )
¡
1 + 
¢ +  () + (1 +  ) (22)
− ¡1 +  ¢ − ¡1 +  ¢ −   
subject to the loan demand function of the CG producer (13), loans from the central
bank (18), the fraction of nonperforming loans (19), and the type of provisioning system
  with  =  (equations (20) or (21)).
The term 1−  stands for the fraction of loans that are repaid to the commercial
bank. In case of an increased likelihood of default, when loans move to the nonper-
forming loans category (problem loans), the bank is partly compensated by seizing
collateral, given by . Loan-loss provisions,   , are deducted from the bank’s
profits but also enter partly as gross income because loan-loss reserves are invested in
government bonds ( =  ). The other terms in (22) are standard.
19To avoid corner solutions we assume that  ≤ ¡1 +  ¢ . In a previous version of this paper
we also accounted (as in Bouvatier and Lepetit (2012)) for recognized losses or charged-oﬀ loans, that
is, loans that are in actual default and removed from the bank’s balance sheet. However, we chose to
ignore them in the present version, because they did not add much additional insight to the analysis.
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In solving the maximization problem defined in (22), the bank takes as given the
fraction of nonperforming loans, the value of collateral, and the refinance rate. The
first-order conditions with respect to the deposit and loan rates are given respectively
by (see Appendix B):
1 +  = 1 + 

1 + −1  (23)
















where  and  are constant interest elasticities of deposits and loan demand, respec-
tively, and, from (17),

 =
¡−1¢ (1− ) ¡  ¢−    (25)
with from (20) and (21), the marginal provisioning cost under each regime is given by
 
 = 0 (26)

 = (1− )0 + 0˜  (27)
Equation (23) indicates that the deposit rate is set as a markup over the refinance
rate.20 Equation (24) describes the lending rate equation; it is the key channel through
which loan-loss provisions aﬀect the financial sector. Intuitively, there are two channels
at play in the determination of the loan rate. The first is a risk premium channel, which
is related to the fact that the bank expects to receive back only a fraction of its loans;
the marginal return on loans is therefore only (1− )(1 +  ). Equivalently, the bank
internalizes the fact that the fraction of nonperforming loans is positive, and charges
a higher loan rate as a result.
The second eﬀect is the (marginal) cost channel, which consists of several com-
ponents. First, there is a direct cost channel associated with changes in the cost of
borrowing from the central bank, 1 +  , which the bank mechanically passes on to
borrowers. Second, there is what we may call (to fix ideas) a provisioning cost channel,




( ) in (24).
This term results from the relationship between loan-loss reserves invested in a safe
20Note that    ∀, implying that the commercial bank always absorbs all deposits made by
households.
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asset and the direct cost eﬀect of raising provisions. Intuitively, a one unit increase in
lending raises the flow of provisions by    ; this is costly for the bank (pro-
visions reduce profits) and accordingly it adjusts the loan rate upward. However, at
the same time, because one unit of loan-loss reserves yield a gross return of 1 +  ,
the commercial bank can lower the cost of borrowing in response to an increase in
provisions. This result implies that if   0, a fall in the bond rate for
instance will tend to be contractionary.21 However, in general whether the composite




( ) is positive or negative cannot be ascer-
tained a priori; the way the provisioning rule determines the behavior of the loan rate
depends on how the fraction of nonperforming loans aﬀects the marginal cost of pro-
visions, which in turn varies across provisioning regimes. As discussed later, the eﬀect
of provisions on the loan rate is determined largely by the persistence parameter .
2.6 Central Bank
The central bank’s assets consist of loans to the commercial bank and holdings of
government bonds,  , whereas its liabilities are given by currency in circulation, :
 + =  (28)
The central bank targets the short term policy rate,  , using a standard (deter-
ministic) Taylor-type rule:
1 + 
1 + ˜ = (
1 + −1








where  is the target inflation rate, ˜ is again the cyclical component of output,
 ∈ (0 1) the degree of interest rate smoothing and     0.
Central bank income generated by supplying loans to the commercial bank and by
holding government bonds are transferred to the government at the end of the period.
2.7 Government
The government spends  on the final good and issues one period risk-free bonds, held
by households, the commercial bank, and the central bank. The government collects
21Bouvatier and Lepetit (2012), in their partial equilibrium model, do not account for a direct
impact of the interest rate on loan-loss reserves on the loan rate as we do here. As discussed later, this
channel does matter when comparing the performance of specific and dynamic provisioning systems.
17
lump-sum taxes on households, pays interest to them on their holding of government
bonds, and receives all interest income made by the central bank. Thus, its budget
constraint in real terms is





where  =  +  +  . Government spending is set as a constant fraction of
output of the final good:
 =  (31)
where  ∈ (0 1).
2.8 Market-Clearing Conditions
In what follows we assume that the government maintains a balanced budget by adjust-
ing lump-sum taxes, while keeping its overall stock of bonds constant at ¯. Moreover,
the stock of bonds held by the central bank is also assumed to be constant at ¯ .22
In a symmetric equilibrium, households are identical and IG firms produce the same
output and set equal prices. Therefore,  =   =   =  and  = 
for all  ∈ (0 1).
The supply of loans by the commercial bank and the supply of deposits by house-
holds are assumed to be perfectly elastic at the prevailing interest rates and therefore
markets for loans and deposits always clear. The goods market clearing condition is
 =  +  + (32)
Loans are made in the form of cash. Therefore, the equilibrium condition in the cur-
rency market is obtained by equating supply and total demand for cash (by households
and firms),
 = +   (33)
After substituting equations (4), (5), (18), and (28), equation (33) can be solved
for the equilibrium bond rate,  .
22Walras’s law ensures that the market for bonds always clears.
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3 Steady State and Log-Linearization
Many of the steady-state solutions of the model are familiar, so we focus here only on
some of the financial variables. Under the assumption of zero inflation in the steady
state, the long-run value of the bond rate is equal to ˜ = −1 − 1. In addition, to
ensure that the commercial bank has no incentive to borrow from the central bank in
order to invest in government bonds, we impose ˜ = ˜. This equality From (23),
this result implies also that ˜  ˜.
In the steady state, loan-loss reserves and loan-loss provisions under both the spe-
cific and dynamic systems are equal to
] =] = 0˜ ˜ 
Hence, the lending rate equation in the long run is also the same under both pro-
visioning rules:





1 + ˜¢− ˜0˜ ]
The log-linearized equations of the model–in terms of percentage point deviations
for price inflation and interest rate variables, and log-deviations for the rest of the
variables–around a non-stochastic steady state are presented in detail in Appendix
C.23 Again, many of these equations are familiar; the New Keynesian Phillips Curve
for instance, which determines the price inflation rate, is given by
ˆ = Eˆ+1 + (1− )(1− ) d
where log-linearized variables are denoted by a hat.
More relevant for the issue at hand, the log-linearized equations representing loan-
loss provisions in the specific and dynamic regimes are respectively given by
\  = b +c 
\ = (1− )b +c 
The log-linear equation that defines the fraction of nonperforming loans is repre-
sented by b =  b + \(  −c ) + b 




\ =  \−1 + (1− )\  
Using this result, the loan rate in its log-linear form is given by
(1− ˜)(1 + ˜)b = (1 + ˜) b + £1− (1 + ˜)¤ ˜ \(  )




b \ = (1− ) b
From the above equations, and as noted earlier, changes in the fraction of nonper-
forming loans and the type of provisioning system impact directly the loan rate. In
turn, the cost of loans is passed to the rental rate of capital, which changes the mar-
ginal cost of producing intermediate goods and thus, all else equal, the inflation rate
and output. Thus, the key channel through which the provisioning regime influences
the link between the financial and real sides of the economy is through the cost of
borrowing.
4 Parameterization
The baseline parameterization of the model is summarized in Table 1. Parameters
that characterize tastes, preferences, technology, adjustment costs, the fraction of firms
that reset their prices, capital depreciation, and the Taylor rule, are all standard in the
literature. We therefore focus on in what follows on the parameters that are new to
this model.
For the variables related to the household, we set , the preference of parameter
for the composite monetary asset, at 001, and the share parameter in the index of
cash holding, , at 040. The combination of these values yields a deposit plus cash
to output ratio of 90 percent, which is on average the ratio of liquid assets to GDP
observed in the European Union (see Levine et al. (2000) and Hou et al. (2012)).
With respect to the parameters associated with the fraction of nonperforming loans
and its relationship with loan-loss provisions, we calibrate the elasticity of the percent-
age of problem loans with respect to the output gap,  , at −02. Although not
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directly comparable, this value is consistent with the empirical results of Bikker and
Metzemakers (2005) using OECD data and Nkusu (2011) for advanced economies, both
of which focus on the impact of GDP growth on loan-loss provisions.24 Nkusu (2011)
for instance found an elasticity of −016 between real GDP growth and nonperforming
loans.
As noted earlier, empirical studies report conflicting eﬀects regarding the impact of
the loan loss reserves-loan ratio on the fraction of nonperforming loans. We therefore
use as a benchmark case  = 0 and will consider later on negative and positive values
of . Moreover, when examining the impact of the dynamic loan loss provisioning
rule, we set the smoothing coeﬃcient, , at 08, implying therefore a high but less
than integral smoothing eﬀect of loan loss provisions over the cycle. In all experiments
the steady-state fraction of nonperforming loans, 0, is 003, consistent with data for
advanced economies. The persistence parameter, , is set at a relatively high value
of 08 initially (to capture the case where loan-loss reserves are driven mainly by past
reserves), and sensitivity analysis is conducted later on. Finally, the government’s share
of spending out of final output, , is set to 030, which corresponds to the average ratio
of the government expenditures-GDP ratio for OECD countries between 2007-09 (see
OECD (2011)). From (32), private absorption (consumption and investment) is thus
70 percent of output.
The above parameterization implies that the steady-state values of the loan rate,
the bond rate, and the rate of return on physical capital are 515 percent, 101 percent,
and 247 percent, respectively. These values are well within the range observed for
industrialized countries.
5 Shock to Nonperforming Loans
The core experiment that we examine is a financial shock, taking the form of a tem-
porary 10 percent relative increase in the fraction of nonperforming loans,  , that is,
an increase in  from 003 to 0033 (or 30 basis points). We compare the performance
of specific and dynamic provisioning rules ( = 0 and  = 08, respectively) in the
benchmark case where  = 0.
24Note that in a number of econometric studies output growth is replaced by the output gap, with
little impact on the results; see for instance Packer and Zhu (2012).
21
Figure 1 shows the impulse response functions of the main variables of the model
following a 10 percent increase in the fraction of nonperforming loans,  , under a
specific provisioning system (blue line) and a dynamic provisioning system (dashed red
line). The direct eﬀect of an exogenous increase in the fraction of nonperforming loans
is an immediate rise in the loan rate, stemming from the risk premium channel; the
commercial bank sets a higher loan rate when the perception of risk is higher. The rise
in the lending rate lowers investment loans and the rate at which physical capital is
accumulated. While by itself a lower capital stock tends to increase the rental rate of
capital, the general equilibrium eﬀect, accounting for the rise in current and expected
nonperforming loans, is to reduce it. As a result, the marginal cost of production falls
as well. Moreover, the drop in employment lowers real wages such that the marginal
costs and consequently inflation fall upon the impact of the shock.
The sharp fall in investment induced by the rise in the loan rate, along with the drop
in the capital stock, leads to a sharp contractionary eﬀect on output. Because both
output and inflation fall, the policy rate, which is determined by the Taylor rule, falls
as well. The deposit rate, set as a mark down on the policy rate, drops also, resulting
in lower demand for deposits and hence (all else equal) an increase in borrowing from
the central bank and an expansion in the monetary base. To raise the demand for cash
and restore equilibrium in the money market, the bond rate must therefore decrease,
which, through intertemporal substitution, results in a higher level of consumption
in the short run. Given our calibration the drop in investment dominates the rise in
consumption and output, relative to its steady-state level, drops initially.25 This in
turn tends to amplify the response of the fraction of nonperforming loans, leading to
a higher loan rate.
The key channels through which changes in provisions aﬀect the real economy come
from the relationship between loan-loss provisions acting as reserves invested in a safe
asset and the direct cost eﬀect of holding provisions–the combination of which we
earlier referred to as the provisioning cost channel. As shown in Figure 1, following
a rise in the percentage of nonperforming loans, the loan-loss provisions-loan ratio
increases. This leads to a higher loan rate through the direct cost eﬀect of raising
provisions–regardless of the provisioning regime.26 However, as also shown in the
25This outcome is quite reasonable, given the nature of the shock.
26Note that the fraction of nonperforming loans doesn’t change much across provisioning regimes,
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figure, dynamic provisions significantly mitigate the increase in the loan rate, and thus
fluctuations on the real side of the economy.
Intuitively, with a dynamic provisioning rule, loan-loss provisions are smoothed
over the cycle in such a way that total provisions are less aﬀected by the current
fraction of nonperforming loans. During a downturn, when the current proportion
of nonperforming loans increases and exceeds its steady-state value, the commercial
bank can draw down its loan loss reserves. This is achieved over time by reducing
the rate at which it accumulates provisions to levels below those required by specific
provisions. Thus, as long as the shock persists and the economy displays monotonic
behavior, total provisions will increase by less than specific provisions. In turn, this
mitigates the increase in the loan rate and dampens the response of investment, output
and inflation. A dynamic provisioning regime therefore attenuates the procyclicality
of the financial system.
Table 2 compares the asymptotic standard deviations (theoretical moments) and the
relative standard deviations of key variables of a specific provisioning system ( = 0), a
moderate dynamic prvisioning system ( = 05) and a highly dynamic system ( = 08)
following a financial shock. The relative standard deviations are calculated relative to
the standard deviations of the specifc provisioning system. The table confirms indeed
that dynamic provisioning is highly eﬀective in terms of mitigating the volatility of key
macroeconomic and financial variables–independently of whether loan-loss reserves
reduce or increase the fraction of nonperforming loans.
6 Sensitivity Analysis
To assess the robustness of the previous results, we focus on two experiments: changes
in the persistence parameter in the loan-loss reserve specification, and nonzero values
of the parameter that captures the impact of loan-loss reserves on nonperforming loans.
6.1 Change in Reserve Persistence Parameter
Consider first the case where  takes a value of 095, higher than in the benchmark
case. The results of this experiment are shown in Figure 2. They are fairly similar to
because it is related to output through a relatively small value of  = 02,  = 00, and it is
driven mainly by the shock to nonperforming loans.
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those discussed previously; a closer inspection of the impulse response functions shows
that the performance of the dynamic provisioning regime, in terms of mitigating macro-
economic and financial instability is improved. Intuitively, as can be inferred from (25),
the higher  is, the closer  will be to zero; the eﬀect of provisions on the
loan rate then depend essentially on changes in    . A comparison of (26) and
(27) shows that, with 0   ≤ 1, the dynamic provisioning regime is more eﬀective in
mitigating an increase in the loan rate. The closer  and  are to unity, the more
eﬀective the regime is.
Alternatively, consider the case where  = 015, where changes in loan-loss re-
serves are mainly driven by changes in current provisions. The results are shown in
Figure 3. With the exception of the loan-loss provision-loan ratio, there are essentially
no meaningful diﬀerences between the two provisioning regimes–even though  ≤ 1.
Put diﬀerently, the reason why a dynamic provisioning regime is more eﬀective in terms
of macroeconomic and financial stability is because it helps to mitigate changes in the
stock of loan-loss reserves in the course of the business cycle. This is precisely the
argument that is typically invoked in practice.
6.2 Monitoring Incentive and Moral Hazard Eﬀects
The foregoing discussion has focused on a comparison of the performance of specific
and dynamic provisioning regimes in the absence of any eﬀect of the loan-loss reserves-
loan ratio on the fraction of nonperforming loans, that is, with  = 0. It was argued
that this is a reasonable benchmark given the conflicting results regarding the sign of
this parameter in the empirical literature.
We now consider the case where  is either negative (the “monitoring incentive”
eﬀect dominates) or positive (the “moral hazard” eﬀect dominates). In both cases we
continue to assume that  = 08.
6.2.1 Monitoring Incentive Eﬀect
Figure 4 shows the results when  takes a small negative value, −015. There is now
an additional channel through which changes in provisions aﬀect the real economy:
the monitoring incentive eﬀect implies that a higher ratio of loan-loss reserves to loans
reduces the fraction of nonperforming loans, and thereby mitigates the initial rise in
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the lending rate following the financial shock.
As shown earlier, following a rise in the percentage of nonperforming loans, the loan-
loss provisions-loan ratio increases, which from the provisioning cost channel increases
the loan rate. With a monitoring incentive eﬀect, the rise in the loan-loss provisions-
loan ratio helps to mitigate the response of the loan rate through its impact on the
fraction of nonperforming loans, that is, through the risk premium channel. Hence,
under the specific system, the provisioning cost channel and the risk premium channel
work in opposite directions. But again, a visual inspection of the results displayed in
Figure 4 show that the dynamic provisioning regime–despite being associated with
a slight increase in the fraction of nonperforming loans–performs better than the
specific provisioning regime in terms of mitigating the procyclicality of the financial
system. This is because the cost eﬀect of provisions dominates the risk premium
channel associated with the stock of reserves.27
6.2.2 Moral Hazard Eﬀect
Figure 5 shows the results when  takes a small positive value, 015. The additional
channel that is considered now is the moral hazard eﬀect, which implies that a higher
ratio of loan-loss reserves to loans raises the fraction of nonperforming loans. As
opposed to the previous case, under the moral hazard scenario, a higher loan-loss
provisions to loan ratio amplifies the rise in the loan rate via the risk premium channel.
Therefore, combined with the direct cost eﬀect of raising provisions, both of these
channels amplify the rise in the cost of borrowing under the specific provisioning regime.
Therefore, dynamic provisions unambiguously dampen the increase in the lending rate
and can promote macroeconomic and financial stability.
In sum, this sensitivity analysis shows that a nonzero value of  in absolute value
magnifies the diﬀerences between specific and dynamic provisioning systems, but it does
not change relative eﬀectiveness of these two regimes in response to financial shocks.
What is important, for understanding the performance of the various provisioning
regimes, is the stock smoothing eﬀect associated with provisions.
27A more formal analysis based on asymptotic variances (as in Table 2) confirms this result. We do
not report the table (neither here nor for   0) to save space.
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7 Monetary Policy and Provisioning Regimes
Finally, we consider a diﬀerent but related experiment–whether an augmented mon-
etary policy rule, which takes into account the behavior of credit gaps, coupled with a
dynamic provisioning system, can lead to even better results in terms of minimizing a
central bank loss function compared to a specific provisioning regime, coupled or not
with a similar augmented rule. Rules of this type have been recently advocated by a
number of observers and have been viewed as consistent with a broader mandate for
central banks concerned with financial stability.28
For this purpose the standard Taylor rule (29) is replaced by the augmented Taylor
rule
1 + 
1 + ˜ = (
1 + −1











where   0 denotes the weight given to fluctuations in the credit-to-GDP ratio
from its steady-state level. Thus, the central bank sets its policy rate also in part to
“lean against the financial cycle.” During an expansionary period for instance, when
collateral values are high, the loan rate falls. This, in turn, stimulates loans to capital
producers and raises the credit-to-output ratio. With rule (34), the policy rate will rise
and mitigate the initial decline in the lending rate, thereby dampening the expansion in
credit. Because the bond rate will tend to increase as well, it will attenuate an increase
in current consumption through the intertemporal substitution eﬀect. Thus, in this
setting an augmented Taylor rule helps to mitigate the inherent procyclical nature of
the financial system.
To study optimal policy responses, we consider two alternative policy loss functions
for the central bank:
1 =  (ˆ) + 025 (ˆ) (35)
2 =  (ˆ) + 025 (ˆ) + 01 (ˆ − ˆ) (36)
where  () denotes the volatility (as measured by the asymptotic variance) of devi-
ations of  from its steady state. Equation (35) takes a fairly standard form, with
the relative weight attached to the volatility of output deviations being significantly
lower than the weight attached to the volatility of inflation deviations from target. The
weight of 025 on output volatility used here has been used also in a number of other
28See, for instance, Agénor and Pereira da Silva (2012) and the references therein.
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contributions in the literature (see, for instance, Walsh (2003)). Equation (35) aug-
ments the loss function to account for the fact that the central bank is also concerned
with financial stability, as measured in terms of the volatility of the credit-to-GDP
ratio–a robust leading indicator of financial crises, as demonstrated in a number of
studies (see, for instance, Gourinchas and Obstfeld (2012) and Schularick and Tay-
lor (2012)). At the same time, as in some other studies (for instance Angelini et al.
(2014)) we assume that the weight attached to financial stability is relatively small.
The central bank remains therefore mainly concerned with macroeconomic stability.
Assuming as in the benchmark case that  = 08 and  = 0, we compute the
loss functions (35) and (36) under four diﬀerent policy regimes. Under Regime A, we
consider a specific provisioning system ( = 0) and a standard Taylor rule; we solve
for the optimal response to inflation, , in the Taylor rule and keep  = 02 and
 = 0. Under Regime B, we consider again a specific provisioning system ( = 0) and
solve now for both the optimal response to inflation, , and the optimal response to
the loan-to-output ratio, , in the augmented Taylor rule, while keeping  = 02 .
Under Regime C, we solve for the optimal value of  only and set  = 0, but we
consider a dynamic provisioning regime and solve for the optimal value of the smoothing
parameter  in the interval (0 1) that characterizes that regime. Under Regime D, we
solve for the optimal values of , , as well as  in the interval (0 1). The key
issue that we want to address is the following: is it optimal to combine a specific or
dynamic provisioning system with a credit gap-augmented Taylor rule to mitigate real
and financial volatility? Equivalently, does Regime D dominate the other regimes in
terms of minimizing central bank losses, as defined in (35) or (36)? Or would a country
be better oﬀ sticking to a specific provisioning system and pursuing a more aggressive
monetary policy, implying instead that Regime B dominates the other regimes?
Table 3 shows the results of these experiments, using a grid step of 01 and assuming
that the upper bound of the search for  is set at 3 (a reasonable value, given the
evidence on confidence intervals associated with point estimates of that parameter) and
no upper bound for . They indicate that it is always optimal to respond strongly to
inflation–a not so surprising result, given that output and inflation move in the same
direction following negative credit shocks. There is a role for an augmented monetary
policy that responds also to deviations in the loan-to-output ratio; however, comparing
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Regime B with regimes C or D, for which the optimal value of  is 1 in both cases, this
role is mitigated when dynamic provisions are implemented. The policy rate rule does
not need to respond as strongly to financial conditions. Overall, the best policy appears
to be a combination of dynamic provisions (with full smoothnig) and an augmented
Taylor rule, regardless of whether a financial stability objective is accounted for or not
in the central bank’s loss function. Moreover, the combination of a standard interest
rate rule and a dynamic provisioning regime with full smoothing performs better than
a credit-augmented interest rate rule with specific provisions.
Clearly, more thorough experiments along the same lines are needed to establish firm
conclusions. In particular, a wider range of shocks could be considered, and alternative
measures of financial stability (involving interest rate spreads, asset prices, and so on)
could be defined. Given the length of this paper, these issues would be best pursued in
future work. Nevertheless, a tentative conclusion from the experiments reported here
is that the combination of an augmented Taylor rule and a dynamic provisioning rule
could deliver superior outcomes in terms of macroeconomic and financial stability. At
a time when many countries, in the wake of the adoption of the Basel III agreement,
are considering the introduction of a variety of countercyclical macroprudential tools,
this result–however tentative–is well worth pondering.
8 Concluding Remarks
The purpose of this paper was to study the interaction between loan-loss provisions
and business cycles in a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with credit
market imperfections. A key distinction is between specific and dynamic provisioning
systems. In the former, provisions are triggered by past due payments (or the frac-
tion of nonperforming loans), which, in turn, depend on current economic conditions
and the loan-loss reserves-loan ratio. Dynamic provisioning, by contrast, take into
account both past due payments and expected losses over the whole business cycle;
provisions are thus smoothed over the cycle and are less aﬀected by the current state
of the economy and past due payments. The solution of the model shows that the type
of provisioning system and the fraction of nonperforming loans influence directly the
behavior of the loan rate, which in turn determine the degree of cyclicality of finan-
cial and real variables in the economy. Numerical experiments with a parameterized
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version showed that a dynamic loan-loss provisioning regime can be highly eﬀective in
mitigating procyclicality of the financial system. Sensitivity analysis confirmed these
results. Finally, we also showed that the combination of a credit gap-augmented Taylor
rule and a dynamic provisioning system with full smoothing may be the most eﬀec-
tive way to mitigate real and financial volatility. In addition, the combination of a
standard Taylor rule and a dynamic provisioning regime with full smoothing performs
better than a credit-augmented rule combined with specific provisions. These results
have potentially important implications for the ongoing debate on the performance of
loan-loss provisioning systems, and more generally on the combination of monetary
policy and macroprudential rules.
The analysis in this paper can be extended in several directions. First, the focus of
this paper has been mainly on the direct, cost eﬀect of loan-loss provisions. However,
another channel that could be explored is the extent to which these provisions may
help to mitigate incentives for risk taking by lenders, and the extent to which this could
contribute to reducing balance sheet vulnerabilities–thereby reducing their probability
of default. Bushman and Williams (2012) for instance, in a study of bank behavior
across 27 countries, found that dynamic provisioning reflecting timely recognition of
expected future loan losses is associated with enhanced risk-taking discipline.
Second, it would be useful to model simultaneously capital requirement regimes
(possibly including a capital buﬀer, in line with the Basel III Accord) and loan-loss
provisioning systems and study how they interact. The common view is that (regular)
bank capital should cover for unexpected credit losses, whereas (dynamic) loan-loss
provisions are intended to cover expected credit losses. However, in practice capital
buﬀers may well be considered as an alternative to dynamic provisions. In addition, and
consistent with the Lucas critique, introducing either one of those regulatory regimes
while the other is present may change the behavior of banks and thus the eﬀectiveness
of both types of tools. This may occur if the reasons why banks hold (excess) capital
buﬀers are altered by the introduction of loan-loss provisions, and if capital buﬀers
have a signaling eﬀect that translates into changes in their market borrowing costs (as
in Agénor et al. (2012) for instance). Put diﬀerently, voluntary capital buﬀers may
be (partial) substitutes for provisions. Thus, understanding the interaction between
bank capital requirements and dynamic provisioning systems–and possibly the optimal
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Table 1
Benchmark Parameterization: Parameter Values
Parameter Value Description
 0.99 Discount factor
−1 0.50 Elasticity of intertemporal substitution
 2.50 Inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply
 0.01 Preference parameter for liquidity holdings 0.40 Share Parameter in index of money holdings
 6.00 Elasticity of demand for intermediate goods
 0.75 Degree of price stickiness
 0.30 Share of capital in Intermediate goods output
 0.03 Depreciation rate of capital
Θ 10.0 Adjustment cost parameter for investment
0 0.03 Steady-state fraction of nonperforming loans
 0.20 Elasticity of fraction of nonperforming loans wrt output gap
 0.00 Elasticity of fraction of nonperforming loans wrt to LLR-loan ratio
 0.80 Persistence parameter in LLR 0.80 Persistence parameter, financial shock
0 1.00 Loan-loss provisions coverage ratio
 0.80 Smoothing coeﬃcient in dynamic provisioning rule
 0.30 Share of government spending in output
 0.80 Degree of persistence in Taylor rule
 1.50 Response of policy rate to inflation deviations 0.20 Response of policy rate to output deviations
Table 2
Changes in Standard Deviations of Key Variables under
Specific and Dynamic Provisioning Systems with  = 080 and  = 00
 = 0  = 05 Rel. S.D.  = 08 Rel. S.D.
Output 0.1946 0.1441 0.7404 0.1157 0.5945
Investment 1.0585 0.7858 0.7423 0.6314 0.5965
Consumption 0.1099 0.0900 0.8189 0.0799 0.7270
Price Inflation 0.0689 0.0518 0.7518 0.0174 0.2525
Loan Rate 0.7120 0.5977 0.8394 0.5344 0.7505
Fraction of nonperforming loans 16.7016 16.693 0.9994 15.463 0.9258
Marginal Cost 0.5809 0.3977 0.6846 0.2889 0.4973
Bond Rate 0.0454 0.0364 0.8017 0.0316 0.6960
Loan-Output Ratio 0.8687 0.6464 0.7441 0.5207 0.5994
LLP-Loan Ratio 16.7016 8.3465 0.4997 3.3376 0.1998
Table 3
Central Bank Losses and Optimal Policy Parameters, Financial Shock
Loss Function 1 Loss Function 2
Regime A
 = 3 = − = −
1 = 00102
 = 3 = − = −
2 = 00747
Regime B
 = 3 = 04 = −
1 = 00033
 = 3 = 14 = −
2 = 00241
Regime C
 = 3 = − = 1
1 = 00023
 = 3 = − = 1
1 = 00191
Regime D
 = 3 = 02 = 1
1 = 00014
 = 3 = 04 = 1
2 = 00132
Notes: Entries shown for the loss functions are absolute values.
Figure 1
Experiment: Transitory Increase in Nonperforming Loans
Benchmark Case: LR = 0:8 and !LR = 0
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Experiment: Transitory Increase in Nonperforming Loans
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Derivation of the Rental Rate of Capital
The stock of capital goods, +1, evolves as






The CG producer chooses the level of capital stock so as to maximize the value of
the discounted stream of dividend payments to households subject to (A1). Specifically,
define expected end-of-period real profits of the CG producer as
E+1 =   −  − (1− )(1 +  ) 








−(1− +)(1 + +)
∙








taking  and  as given.
The first-order condition with respect to +1 yields,
+1+1 − (1− )(1 +  ) + +1(1− +1)(1 + +1)(1− )
−(1− )(1 +  )Θ(+1 − 1)

 − +1+1












+1+1 − (1− )(1 +  ) + +1(1− +1)(1 + +1)(1− )
−(1− )(1 +  )Θ(+1 ) + (1− )(1 + 
 )Θ − +1+1
−+1(1− +1)(1 + +1)Θ2 (
+2
+1 )
2 + +1)(1− +1)(1 + +1)Θ2 2
+2
+1
−+1(1− +1)(1 + +1)Θ2
++1(1− +1)(1 + +1)Θ(+2+1 )
2 − +1(1− +1)(1 + +1)Θ+2+1 = 0
Collecting terms,
+1+1−(1−)(1+ )++1(1−+1)(1++1)(1−)−(1−)(1+ )Θ(+1 )
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+(1− )(1 +  )Θ − +1+1
++1(1− +1)(1 + +1)Θ2 (
+2
+1 )
2 − +1(1− +1)(1 + +1)Θ2 = 0
or,






+1− (1− +1)(1 + +1)
∙










+1 = +1 (1− )(1 + 
 )
∙




+1− (1− +1)(1 + +1)
½













1 + +1 
Substituting this result above and inserting back the expectations operator yields
E+1 = (1− )(1 +  )E
½∙








+1 − (1− +1)(1 + +1)
½









which, with +1 = 1(1 + +1), is equation (15) in the text.
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Appendix B
Derivation of the Loan Rate and Deposit Rate









 =  −
  = 0 for  = 
  = 0 + 
³ e − ´ 0 for  = 
 = (−1)()1− 
with  taken as given.
The first-order condition with respect to 1 +  yields




 (1 +  )
+(1 +  )







 (1 +  )








 (1 +  ) = 0








 (1 +  ) = 0
Noting that   = 1 yields




 (1 +  )












 (1 +  ) = 0
dividing by  ,




 (1 +  )
1
















¢  ] as the interest elasticity of the loan de-
mand and treating it as a constant, the above reduces to




(1 +  )






(1 +  ) = 0
multiplying by 1 +  ,
































The log-linearized equations of the model are based on the steady-state solutions
and represent percentage point deviations for price inflation, wage inflation and interest
rate variables, and log-deviations around a non-stochastic steady state for the rest of
the variables.30 The log-linearized variables, denoted with hats, are listed below.
The Euler equation,
b = Ed+1 − ( b − Ed+1)
Deposits, c =  b + 1 + ˜
(˜ − ˜)(
b − b )
Household real money balances,
d =  b − ( 1−  ) b 
Real wages, d = c +  b
Employment (from the production function),
c = 1
1−  b − 1− c − 11− c
Capital-labor ratio, c −c =d − (1 + ˜)˜ c 
Marginal cost, d = (1− )d + (1 + ˜)˜ c −c
The New Keynesian Phillips Curve, which determines the price inflation rate, is
given by,
ˆ = Eˆ+1 + (1− )(1− ) d
Investment loans, c = b
Deposit rate, b = b 
with b defined by the Taylor rule.
30Therefore, log-linearized net interest rates are used as an approximation for log-linearized gross
interest rates.
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The rental price of capital,
(1 + ˜)Ed+1 = (1− ˜)(1 + ˜)(1 + ˜) hb + b − Ed+1 +ΘE([+1 −c)i
−(1 +e)(1 +e) e b − (1− e)(1 +e) h(1− )d+1 +ΘE([+2 −[+1)i
+
h
+ (1 +e)(1− )i eEd+1
Evolution of capital,
E[+1 =  b + (1− )c
Central bank borrowing,c = 1˜
n
˜c − (1− )˜co 
Loan-loss provisions in the specific and dynamic systems are respectively given by,
\  = b +c 
\ = (1− )b +c 
The fraction of nonperforming loans in its log-linear form is represented by,b =  b + (\  −c ) + b 
Loan-loss reserves,
\ =  \−1 + (1− )\ 
The loan rate,
(1− ˜)(1 + ˜)b = (1 + ˜) b + £1− (1 + ˜)¤ ˜ \µ 
¶
−




b for the specific provisioning regime and \³ ´ = (1−)b for the
dynamic provisioning regime.
The goods market equilibrium,
˜ b = ˜ b + ˜b + ˜c
where c = b.
Taxes,
˜ b − ˜c = (1 + ˜)d−1 + (˜− ˜ − ¯)b − ˜˜d−1 − (1 + ˜)˜d−1
Finally, after the substitutions mentioned in the text, the log-linear money market
equilibrium condition, from which b is obtained, is given by
˜c + ˜d = 0
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